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Liquidity in Asset Markets with Search Frictions  
By Ricardo Lagos and Guillaume Rocheteau 
 
 
We study how trading frictions in asset markets affect the distribution of asset holdings, 
asset prices, efficiency, and standard measures of liquidity. To this end, we analyze the 
equilibrium and optimal allocations of a search-theoretic model of financial 
intermediation similar to Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005). In contrast with the 
existing literature, the model we develop imposes no restrictions on asset holdings, so 
traders can accommodate frictions by varying their trading needs through changes in their 
asset positions. We find that this is a critical aspect of investor behavior in illiquid 
markets. A reduction in trading frictions leads to an increase in the dispersion of asset 
holdings and trade volume. Transaction costs and intermediaries’ incentives to make 
markets are nonmonotonic in trade frictions. With the entry of dealers, these 
nonmonotonicities give rise to an externality in liquidity provision that can lead to 
multiple equilibria. Tight spreads are correlated with large volume and short trading 
delays across equilibria. From a normative standpoint we show that the asset allocation 
across investors and the number of dealers are socially inefficient.  
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Asset markets have traditionally been the realm of the Walrasian paradigm. Trade in these
markets, e.g., the matching of buyers and sellers, is typically regarded as an instantaneous and
costless process–and left unmodeled. The fact remains that the vast majority of real assets,
such as houses and cars, and a large volume of ﬁnancial assets, such as derivative securities,
federal funds, unlisted stocks and most ﬁxed-income securities, are traded in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets. OTC markets operate in a completely decentralized manner: trade is bilateral,
with prices and quantities negotiated by the parties involved in each trade.1 In this paper we
further the view that prying into the microstructure of decentralized asset markets by explicitly
modelling the trading process is important to understand and assess the performance of these
markets.
A recent literature pioneered by Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) (DGP hereafter)
uses search theory to model the trading frictions characteristic of OTC markets.2 The search-
based approach is appealing because it can parsimoniously rationalize standard measures of
liquidity–bid-ask spreads, execution delays and trade volume–and lends itself to study how
the market structure and market conditions inﬂuence these measures. A virtue of DGP’s search-
based theory of liquidity is that it is analytically tractable, so that all these eﬀects can be well
understood.
The literature spurred by DGP, however, keeps the framework tractable by imposing a
stark restriction on asset holdings, namely, that investors can only hold either 0 or 1 unit of the
asset. In eﬀect, the ability of market participants to respond to changes in market conditions
is limited rather severely by this restriction. In this paper we develop a search-based model
of liquidity in asset markets with no restrictions on investors’ asset holdings. The model is
close in structure and in spirit to DGP, but captures the heterogeneous responses of individual
investors to changes in market conditions. From the broader perspective of search and matching
1For a description of OTC markets for corporate and municipal bonds, see Schultz (2001), Saunders, Srini-
vasan and Walter (2002) and Harris and Piwowar (2005). The functioning of the OTC market for federal funds
is described in Hamilton (1996) and Ashcraft and Duﬃe (2007). Even in equity markets, where trading arrange-
ments are often well developed, trading frictions exist and can be signiﬁcant, see Boehmer (2005, Table 6), and
Stoll (2006b).
2T h es e a r c h - t h e o r e t i cl i t e r a t u r eo nﬁnancial markets includes Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005), Gârleanu
(2006), Miao (2006), Rust and Hall (2003), Spulber (1996) and Weill (2007). There is also a large related
literature, not search-based, which studies how exogenously speciﬁed transaction costs aﬀect the functioning of
asset markets. Recent examples include Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) and Vayanos (1998). See Heaton and
Lucas (1995) for a survey of this body of work.
2theory, a striking feature of the model we develop is that it remains analytically tractable
despite the large degree of heterogeneity among agents which is propagated endogenously by
random matching with unrestricted asset holdings.3 We provide a full characterization of the
equilibrium–including the endogenous distribution of investors’ asset positions–and are able
to show how it depends on all the details of the market structure. The methodology we put
forward allows us to analyze both steady-state and dynamic equilibria. Although we emphasize
the application to OTC markets for ﬁnancial securities, the structure and solution techniques
we have developed should also prove useful for other applied issues in search theory and other
macroeconomic models with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Our methodological contribution provides new insights into how trading frictions aﬀect
outcomes in ﬁnancial markets. We ﬁnd that as a result of the restrictions on asset holdings,
existing search-based theories of ﬁnancial liquidity neglect a critical aspect of investor behavior
in illiquid markets, namely the fact that market participants can mitigate trading frictions
by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs.4 The key theoretical
observation is that an investor’s asset demand in an OTC market depends on a weighted average
of his current marginal utility from holding the asset at the time of the trade and his expected
marginal valuation over future random trading times. A reduction in trading delays makes high
valuation investors who subsequently draw low preference shocks less likely to remain locked
into holding an undesirably large position for a long period of time. Thus, reductions in trading
frictions induce investors with high valuations to put more weight on their current valuation and
therefore to choose larger asset positions. The converse is true for investors with low valuations.
This asset reallocation mechanism implies that reductions in trading frictions tend to increase
the distribution of trade sizes (in the ﬁrst-order stochastic sense). These endogenous responses
of individual investors’ asset demands have a signiﬁcant impact on market eﬃciency and asset
3One can think of DGP as being to the search-based theory of ﬁnancial markets what Kiyotaki and Wright
(1993) is to search-based monetary theory. DGP restricted asset holdings for the same technical reasons why
Kiyotaki and Wright restricted money holdings to {0,1}, i.e., to keep the endogenous distribution of asset holdings
manageable. The recent monetary literature, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), allows for unrestricted portfolios and
keeps the analysis tractable by making assumptions that render the equilibrium distribution of money holdings
degenerate. By way of comparison, the model we develop here allows for unrestricted portfolios and remains
tractable even though we make no attempt to harness the heterogeneity that is generated by the model dynamics.
In fact, we are even able to provide a closed-form characterization of the endogenous distribution of asset holdings
not only in the steady state, but also along the dynamic equilibrium path.
4The importance of this mechanism in the context of another class of models–those with exogenous trans-
action costs–has been stressed by Constantinides (1986) (for the case of proportional transaction costs) and by
Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) (for the case of ﬁxed trading costs).
3prices as well as trade volume, bid-ask spreads and trading delays–precisely the dimensions of
market liquidity which search-based theories of ﬁnancial liquidity were designed to explain.
Trade volume is a manifestation of the extent to which the exchange mechanism is able to
reallocate assets across investors. According to the theory, large trade volumes are characteristic
of liquid markets, i.e., markets where investors are able to switch in and out of asset positions
relatively fast. We ﬁnd that trading frictions have a direct as well as two indirect general
equilibrium eﬀects on trade volume. If investors ﬁnd trading opportunities more frequently, the
number of investors who are able to trade rises, but the number of investors who are mismatched
w i t ht h e i rc u r r e n tp o r t f o l i of a l l s .T h e s et w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects of trading frictions on trade volume
can be found in the existing literature. In addition, we ﬁnd that a reduction in trading frictions
shifts the equilibrium distribution of investors across desired and actual asset holdings in a way
that tends to increase trade volume. This general equilibrium eﬀect is implicitly shut oﬀ if one
restricts asset holdings to lie in {0,1}, which is why our model has diﬀerent predictions for
the behavior of trade volume in response to changes in the microstructure of the market. For
example, in its basic formulation, DGP predicts that trade volume is independent of dealers’
market power. In contrast, our model implies that trade volume will be lower in markets where
dealers have more power to set the terms of trade.
From an investor’s standpoint, bid-ask spreads represent the out-of-pocket transaction costs
of trading in an illiquid market. In a search-based theory with bilateral bargaining, the bid-
ask spread is increasing in the investor’s value to immediate trade and decreasing in his value
of searching for an alternative trade opportunity. In DGP, for example, where there is a
unique trade size which is ﬁxed and equal to unity, a decrease in trading frictions increases
investors’ value of searching for alternative trades, and the bid-ask spread narrows. We ﬁnd
that endogenizing investors’ choices of asset holdings yields a richer set of empirical predictions
for transaction costs. The fees or spreads that dealers charge still depend on the ease with
which investors can ﬁnd alternative trading partners, but in addition, they also depend on the
extent of the mismatch between investors’ endogenous asset positions and their valuations for
the asset. Our model predicts a distribution of transaction costs, both across trade sizes–with
spreads that increase with the size of the trade–as well as within a given trade-size category–
across investors with diﬀerent valuations. We also show that investors who are better informed
about trading opportunities or have a higher bargaining power will trade larger quantities at a
lower cost per dollar traded.
4Trading delays, i.e., the fact that a counterpart for trade cannot be found instantaneously,
is perhaps the fundamental distinguishing feature of the microstructure of an OTC market.
The time it takes to execute a trade not only inﬂuences measures of liquidity such as trade
volume and spreads, but it is often also used as a measure of market liquidity in itself. We
endogenize trading delays by allowing free entry of dealers. This is a simple and natural
ﬁnancial market structure, yet one whose implications have not been explored so far.5 In this
context we again ﬁnd that the model with unrestricted asset holdings bears new theoretical
predictions, including a fundamental change of the equilibrium set. When interacted with the
investors’ unrestricted asset holding decisions, the dealers’ incentives to make markets generate
a liquidity externality which can give rise to multiple equilibria. Tight spreads are correlated
with large volume and short trading delays across equilibria. Scarce liquidity can arise naturally
as a self-fulﬁlling phenomenon in asset markets and a reduction in trading frictions can remove
the multiplicity. Thus, perhaps counter to intuition, it is possible that a regulatory reform or
a technological innovation that gives investors more direct access to the asset market (such as
Electronic Communication Networks) leads to a relatively large increase in market liquidity and
a higher volume of intermediated trades.
Finally, our model uncovers some novel insights regarding the welfare costs and ineﬃciencies
associated with illiquid asset markets. With exogenous contact rates, the search equilibrium
is eﬃcient in the basic model of DGP. In particular, the dealers’ market power has no eﬀect
on welfare: transaction costs are a pure transfer from investors to dealers. In contrast, the
same ex-post bargaining protocol implies that asset holdings tend to be ineﬃcient in our model
because the dealers’ market power distorts the investors’ incentives to hold diﬀerent asset po-
sitions. Investors with high valuations tend to invest too little, while those with low valuations
tend to invest too much so the resulting equilibrium distribution of asset holdings is too concen-
trated. This ineﬃciency is eliminated if and only if dealers have no market power. With entry,
dealers will not participate in market-making unless they have some market power. Thus, the
ineﬃciencies on the intensive margin (investors’ asset holdings) and the extensive margin (the
number of dealers) cannot be corrected simultaneously: the size of the intermediation sector
and investors’ choices of asset holdings are generically ineﬃcient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the basic environment in Section
2 and the equilibrium and its normative properties in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze
5The practical relevance of this microstructure is described in Section 14.1 in Harris (2003).
5the eﬀects of trading frictions on the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings, trade volume
and asset prices. Section 5 studies the eﬀects of trading frictions on spreads. Section 6 deals
with free entry. In Section 7 we use a parametrized version of the model to discuss some
additional empirical predictions. In Section 8 we use the theory to analyze the eﬀects of some
recent technological and regulatory reforms in ﬁnancial markets. Section 9 contrasts our main
theoretical predictions to those of the related literature. Section 10 concludes.
2 Environment
Time is continuous, starts at t =0and goes on forever. There are two types of inﬁnitely-lived
agents: a unit measure of investors and a unit measure of dealers. There is one asset, one
perishable consumption good called fruit, and another consumption good deﬁned as numéraire.
The asset is durable, perfectly divisible and in ﬁxed supply, A ∈ R+. Each unit of the asset
produces a unit ﬂow of fruit. There is no market for fruit, so holding the asset is necessary
to consume this good. The numéraire good is produced and consumed by all agents. The
instantaneous utility function of an investor is ui(a)+c,w h e r ea ∈ R+ represents the fruit
consumption (which coincides with the investor’s asset holdings), c ∈ R is the net consumption
of the numéraire good (c<0 if the investor produces more of these goods than he consumes),
and i ∈ X = {1,...,I} indexes a preference type.6 The utility function ui(a) is continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.7 Each investor receives a preference shock
6The fact that we assume a single type of asset is without loss of generality. As long as all assets are traded
in the interdealer market we describe below, it would be easy to allow for any ﬁnite number of asset types.
Formally, with m asset types an investor’s asset holdings and utility function would be a ∈ R
m
+ and ui : R
m
+ → R,
respectively, but the analysis would essentially remain unchanged.
7Our speciﬁcation associates a certain utility to the investor as a function of his asset holdings. This is a
feature that we have borrowed from DGP. The utility the investor gets from holding a given asset position could
be simply the value from enjoying the asset itself, as would be the case for real assets such as cars or houses.
Alternatively, we can also think of the asset as being physical capital. Then, if each investor has linear utility
over a single consumption good (as is the case in most search models), we can interpret ui (·) as a production
technology that allows the agent to use physical capital to produce the consumption good. The idiosyncratic
component “i” can then be interpreted as a productivity shock that induces agents with low productivity to sell
their capital to agents with high productivity in an OTC market. As yet another possibility, one could adopt
the preferred interpretation of DGP, namely that ui(a) is in fact a reduced-form utility function that stands
in for the various reasons why investors may want to hold diﬀerent quantities of the asset, such as diﬀerences
in liquidity needs, ﬁnancing or ﬁnancial-distress costs, correlation of asset returns with endowments (hedging
needs), or relative tax disadvantages (as in Michaely and Vila (1996)). By now, several papers that build on
the work of DGP have formalized the “hedging needs” interpretation. Examples include Duﬃe, Gârleanu and
Pedersen (2006), Gârleanu (2006) and Vayanos and Weill (2007). (See also Lo, Mamaysky and Lang (2004).)
These derivations typically start with investors who have CARA preferences, and then show that the risk-neutral
approximation to this economy is essentially identical to the economy with linear reduced-form utility for the
6with Poisson arrival rate δ. This process is independent across investors. Conditional on the
preference shock, the probability the investor draws preference type i is πi,w i t h
PI
i=1 πi =1 .8
These preference shocks capture the notion that investors will value the fruit from the asset
diﬀerently over time thereby generating a need for investors to rebalance their asset positions.
Dealers do not hold positions and their instantaneous utility is c, their consumption of the
numéraire good.9 All agents discount at rate r>0.
There is a competitive market for the asset and dealers have continuous access to it. In-
vestors do not have access to this competitive market but they contact dealers who can trade
in this market on their behalf. Meetings with dealers occur at random according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate α.10 Once they have contacted each other, the dealer and the investor
negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer will acquire for the investor and over the
intermediation fee that the investor will pay the dealer for his services. After the transaction
has been completed, the dealer and the investor part ways.
Asset holdings and preference types lie in the sets R+ and X, respectively, and vary across
investors and over time. We describe this heterogeneity with a probability space (S,Σ,H t),
where S = R+ × X, Σ is a σ-algebra on the state space S and Ht is a probability measure on
Σ which represents the distribution of investors across asset holdings and preference types at
time t.
asset–a special case of our speciﬁcation. For our purposes, the bottom line is that our preference structure
is consistent with these formalizations, but moreover, that it is general enough to possibly accommodate other
formalizations as well. Finally, notice that investors in DGP, and therefore the investors in our paper, are akin to
the liquidity traders which are commonplace in the large body of the ﬁn a n c em i c r o s t r u c t u r el i t e r a t u r et h a tu s e s
asymmetric information instead of search frictions to rationalize bid-ask spreads, such as Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).
8The assumption that the draw of the new preference shock is independent of the old preference shock allows
us to solve for the value functions and the joint stationary distribution of portfolios and preference types in
closed form. The assumption is otherwise inessential for our main results. See Gârleanu (2006) for an alternative
formulation of these preference shocks.
9The restriction that dealers cannot hold assets is immaterial when analyzing steady-state equilibria. See
Weill (2007) and Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007) for dynamic equilibria where dealers can choose to hold
positions.
10While our description of the trading process is stylized, it captures the salient features of the actual trading
arrangements in OTC markets. We refer the interested reader to the discussion in Section 2.1 in Lagos and
Rocheteau (2006).
73 Equilibrium
Let Vi (a,t) denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by an investor who has





+ e−r(Tα−t){Vk(Tα)[ak(Tα)(Tα),T α] − p(Tα)[ak(Tα)(Tα) − a] − φk(Tα)(a,Tα)}
¸
, (1)
where Tα denotes the next time the investor contacts a dealer and k(s) ∈ X denotes the investor’s
preference type at time s. The expectations operator, Ei, is taken with respect to the random
variables Tα and k(s) a n di si n d e x e db yi to indicate that the expectation is conditional on
k(t)=i.T h eﬁrst term on the right side of (1) contains the expected discounted utility ﬂows
enjoyed by the investor over the interval of time [t,Tα]. The length of this interval, Tα − t,
is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 1/α.T h e ﬂow utility is indexed
b yt h ep r e f e r e n c et y p eo ft h ei n v e s t o r ,k(s), which follows a compound Poisson process. The
second term on the right side of (1) is the expected discounted utility of the investor from the
time when he next contacts a dealer, Tα, onwards. At this time Tα the investor readjusts his
asset holdings from a to ak(Tα)(Tα). In this event the dealer purchases ak(Tα)(Tα) − a in the
market (or sells if this quantity is negative) at price p(Tα) on behalf of the investor. At this
time the investor pays the dealer an intermediation fee φk(Tα)(a,Tα). Since the intermediation
fee is determined in a bilateral meeting, it may depend on the investor’s preference type and
asset holdings.11 Both the fee and the asset price are expressed in terms of the numéraire good.









where the expectations operator, E, is taken with respect to Tα, which denotes the next time at
which the dealer meets an investor. The random variable Tα−t is exponentially distributed with
mean 1/α. Random matching implies that the investor whom the dealer meets is a random
draw from the population of investors at time Tα. Thus, the dealer calculates the expected
11Our notation for the investor’s new asset position, ak(Tα)(Tα), makes explicit that it may depend on time
and on the investor’s preference type at the time of the trade. In Lemma 1 we will show that the investor’s
new asset position is independent of the asset position he was holding at the time of the trade. To simplify the
notation we anticipate this result and do not include the investor’s asset holding at the time of the trade, a,a s
an argument of his new asset position.
8intermediation fee using the measure of investors across preference types and asset holdings at
time Tα,d e n o t e dHTα.
We turn to the determination of the terms of trade in bilateral meetings between dealers
and investors. Consider a meeting at time t between a dealer and an investor of type i who is
holding a.L e ta0 denote the investor’s post-trade asset holdings and φ the intermediation fee.
We take the pair (a0,φ) to be the outcome corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining
problem where the dealer has bargaining power η ∈ [0,1]. The utility of the investor is Vi(a0,t)−
p(t)(a0−a)−φ if an agreement (a0,φ) is reached, and Vi(a,t) in case of disagreement. Therefore,
the investor’s gain from trade is Vi(a0,t) − Vi(a,t) − p(t)(a0 − a) − φ. Analogously, the utility
of the dealer is W (t)+φ if an agreement (a0,φ) is reached and W (t) in case of disagreement,
so the dealer’s gain from trade is the fee, φ.12 The bargaining outcome is
[ai(t),φ i(a,t)] = arg max
(a0,φ)
[Vi(a0,t) − Vi(a,t) − p(t)(a0 − a) − φ]1−ηφη, (2)
where the maximization is subject to the short-selling constraint a0 ≥ 0.T h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a
characterizes the bargaining solution taking the investor’s value function as given.
Lemma 1 T h eo u t c o m eo ft h eb a r g a i n i n gp r o b l e m( 2 )i s





φi (a,t)=η{Vi [ai (t),t] − Vi(a,t) − p(t)[ai (t) − a]}. (4)
According to Lemma 1, the quantity of assets the investor buys, ai (t) − a, maximizes the
total surplus of the match (the sum of the dealer’s and the investor’s gains from trade). The
intermediation fee is set to divide the total surplus according to each agent’s bargaining power.
From (3), it is immediate that the investor’s new asset position, ai (t), is independent of a.
Next, we use Lemma 1 to recast the investor’s problem.





+ e−r(Tα−t){(1 − η)max
a0≥0
£





12It would be equivalent to set φ =( ˆ p − p)(a
0 − a) and reformulate the bargaining problem as a choice of
(a
0 − a),t h es i z eo ft h eo r d e r ,a n dˆ p, the transaction price charged or paid by the dealer. So if a
0 >athen the
investor is a buyer and ˆ p>pcan be interpreted as the ask price charged by the dealer. Conversely, if a
0 <a
then the investor is a seller and ˆ p<pis the bid price paid by the dealer.
9It is apparent from (5) that the investor’s payoﬀ is the one he would get in an economy where he
meets dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α, but instead of bargaining, he
readjusts his asset position and extracts the whole surplus with probability 1−η,w h e r e a sw i t h
probability η he cannot readjust his asset position and enjoys no gain from trade. Thus, from
the investor’s standpoint, the stochastic trading process and the bargaining solution are payoﬀ-
equivalent to an alternative trading arrangement in which he has all the bargaining power in
bilateral negotiations with dealers, but only gets to meet dealers according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate κ = α(1 − η).L e tTκ denote the next time the investor contacts a dealer in
this economy. We can rewrite (5) as
Vi(a,t)=¯ Ui(a)+Ei[e−r(Tκ−t){p(Tκ)a +m a x
a0≥0








The expectations operator, Ei, is taken with respect to the random variables Tκ and k(s),w h e r e
Tκ −t is exponentially distributed with mean 1/κ.13 From (6), the problem of an investor with




¯ Ui(a0) − {p(t) − E[e−r(Tκ−t)p(Tκ)]}a0
i
. (8)
The investor chooses his asset holdings in order to maximize the expected present discounted
value of his utility ﬂow net of the expected present discounted value of the cost of holding
the asset from time t until the next eﬀective time Tκ when he can readjust his holdings. The
following lemma oﬀers a simpler, equivalent formulation of the investor’s choice of asset holdings.
Lemma 2 An investor with preference type i and asset holdings a who readjusts his asset











r + κ + δ
(10)








13As our notation makes explicit, ¯ Ui(a) is independent of t. This follows from the time-homogeneity of the
Poisson meeting process and the Markovian process for k(s). The right side of (7) only depends on t through
the conditioning k(t)=i, which is captured by the “i” subscript.




is the opportunity cost plus the ex-
pected discounted capital loss, and ¯ ui(a)=( r + κ)¯ Ui(a) the expected discounted utility (both
expressed in ﬂow terms) that the investor experiences by holding a from time t until his next
opportunity to trade. Note that ¯ ui (a) is a weighted average of the utilities in the various pref-
erence states. These weights depend on the transition rates α and δ, the discount rate r,t h e
dealer’s bargaining power, η, and the probability distribution {πk}
I
k=1. It follows from Lemma
2 that an optimal choice of asset holdings ai (t) satisﬁes
¯ u0
i [ai(t)] ≤ q(t),“ = ”i f ai(t) > 0.( 1 2 )
Notice that we do not need to know the path for the price of the asset, p(t),t os o l v ef o rt h e
investor’s optimal asset holdings; q(t) suﬃces. The following lemma establishes the relationship
between p(t) and q(t).
Lemma 3 (a) Condition (11) implies















Part (a) of Lemma 3 provides additional insights into the investor’s problem. Together with
(12), (13) implies that if the investor holds the asset, his demand will satisfy ¯ u0
i [ai(t)]+ ˙ p(t)−
˙ q(t)
r+κ = rp(t). For example, if ˙ q(t) > 0, then the investor will choose a smaller asset position
than he would if he were not subject to trading delays (e.g., if he faced a very large κ for a
given price trajectory). Part (b) shows how to recover the path of asset prices from the path of
capital gains, q(t). In Appendix B we show that p(t) must satisfy limt→∞ e−rtp(t)=0in any
equilibrium, so we can appeal to this condition without loss of generality.
We can now simplify the expression for the intermediation fee that an agent in state i
with asset holdings a pays the dealer who readjusts his asset position. From (4), φi(a,t)=
η{Vi [ai(t),t] − Vi(a,t) − p(t)[ai(t) − a]},w i t hai(t) characterized by (12). If we use (6) to
substitute for the value functions we arrive at
φi(a,t)=
η{¯ ui [ai(t)] − ¯ ui (a) − q(t)[ai(t) − a]}
r + κ
. (15)
11The intermediation fee depends on the dealer’s bargaining power, η, the discount factor, r,a n d
the transition rates α and δ. It also varies with the investor’s asset holdings at the time the
trade is executed, a,a sw e l la sw i t hh i sd e s i r e da s s e th o l d i n g s ,ai.
Next, consider the determination of investors’ eﬀective cost of holding the asset, q(t).S i n c e
each investor faces the same probability of trade irrespective of his asset holdings, we appeal to
the Law of Large Numbers to assert that over a small interval of time dt, the quantity of assets
supplied in the interdealer market equals αdtA.14 Let ni(t) denote the measure of investors
with preference type i at time t. The process for preference shocks implies ˙ ni(t)=δπi − δni(t)
for all i.H e n c e ,
ni(t)=e−δtni(0) + (1 − e−δt)πi, for i ∈ X. (16)
The measure of type-i investors who trade through a dealer over a small interval of time dt is
αni(t)dt, so the demand for assets is αdt
PI





If we use (12) to substitute ai (t) from (17), it becomes clear that this condition determines a
unique q(t).
Investors diﬀer in their preference types and in their asset holdings. The heterogeneity in
preference types is induced by the stochastic preference shocks and the heterogeneity in asset
holdings is induced by the random trading process. Speciﬁcally, because prices vary over time,
an investor’s current asset holdings depend on the time that has elapsed since his last trade,
as well as on his preference type at the time of his last trade. At every point in time there
is a nondegenerate distribution of last contact times and of preference types at the last time
of contact, and hence a nondegenerate distribution of asset holdings. Consider a set of asset
holdings A ⊆ R+ and a set of preference types I ⊆ X, then for all (A,I) ∈ Σ, Ht (A,I) deﬁnes
the measure of investors whose asset holdings lie in A and whose preference types lie in I.W e
characterize this probability measure in the following lemma, where we use I{a∈A} to denote an
indicator function that equals 1 if a ∈ A and 0 otherwise.














14For a derivation of the Law of Large Numbers in random-matching environments, see Duﬃe and Sun (2007).






















At time 0, the market starts oﬀ with investors distributed across preference types and asset
holdings according to the initial probability measure H0. At any subsequent time t>0,t h e r e
are two types of agents, those who have not contacted a dealer since time 0 and those who
have. Among the former, the measure whose asset holdings and preference types lied in the set
(A,{j}) at time 0 is e−αtH0 (A,{j}).A tt i m et all these investors are holding the same asset
position they were holding at time 0, but their preference types may have changed. The time-t
measure of investors who started oﬀ with preference type j and assets in A, whose preference
type is i at the current time t, and who have never traded (so their asset holdings are still in
A)i sn0
ji(A,t) as given in (21). Analogously, nji(τ,t) in (19) and (20) give the time-t density
of investors who are holding asset position aj (t − τ); i.e., those investors whose last trade was
at time t − τ when their preference type was j, and who have preference type i at time t.W e
are now ready to deﬁne equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a time-path h{ai(t)},q(t),p(t),{φi(a,t)},H ti that satisﬁes (12),
(14), (15), (17) and (18), given an initial condition H0.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium.
The equilibrium can be found as follows. Equations (12) and (17) determine {ai(t)} and
q(t).G i v e n{ai(t)} and q(t), (14) and (15) imply p(t) and φi(a,t), respectively. Finally, from
{ai(t)} the distribution of investors’ states is given by (18).
To illustrate how a reduction in trading frictions aﬀects the equilibrium, consider the limiting
case where trading delays vanish, i.e., α →∞ . From (10), ¯ ui(a) → ui(a) and from (12) and
(13), assuming an interior solution, we get u0
i [ai (t)] = q(t)=rp(t)− ˙ p(t) for all i. Using (17) the
eﬀective cost of holding the asset converges to q∗(t),w h i c hs o l v e s
PI
i=1 ni (t)u0−1
i [q∗(t)] = A.
From (15) we see that φi(a,t) → 0 for all a, i and t. With regards to the distribution of
13investors, (21) implies that the measure of agents who have not contacted a dealer since time
0 vanishes; i.e., n0
ji(A,t) → 0 for all i and j,a l lt and all A ⊆ R+ as α →∞ . Also, as α →∞ ,
Ht (A,I) →
P
i∈I I{ai(t)∈A}ni(t); i.e., every investor of every type i holds his desired portfolio
ai (t) at all times.15 Summarizing, as frictions vanish, investors choose ai (t) continuously by
equating their current marginal utility from holding the asset to its eﬀective cost–the ﬂow
opportunity cost minus the capital gain. The equilibrium fees, asset price and distribution of
asset holdings are the ones that would prevail in a Walrasian economy.16
3.1 Eﬃciency
We now turn to the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium. We study the problem of a social
planner who maximizes the expected discounted sum of all agents’ utilities. When choos-
ing allocations, the planner is subject to the same frictions that investors and dealers face
in the decentralized formulation studied above. Speciﬁcally, these frictions imply that over a
s m a l li n t e r v a lo ft i m eo fl e n g t hdt the planner can only reallocate assets among a measure αdt
of investors chosen at random from the population. The planner chooses among allocations
{ai(t)}
I
i=1 that specify how to distribute the measure αdtA of assets among the measure αdt of
investors whose asset positions he can reallocate at t.
Since the numéraire good enters linearly in the utility function of all agents, the consumption
and production of these goods net out to 0 and can be ignored by the planner. Therefore, the
planner only maximizes the investors’ direct utilities from holding the asset. Given the initial















αni(t)ai(t) ≤ αA,( 2 2 )
˙ ni(t)=δ [πi − ni(t)] (23)
15To see this, note that the time-t density of agents who have not contacted a dealer since time t − τ>0 is
n(τ,t)=
SI
i,j=1 nji(τ,t). From (19) and (20), α →∞implies n(τ,t) → 0 for all τ>0, i.e., investors can ﬁnd a
dealer instantly when α is arbitrarily large, so the measure of investors who have not met a dealer between t−τ
and t is zero for all τ>0. As for those investors who have met a dealer this “instant,” we see from (19) and
(20) that nji(0,t)=0for i 6= j and nii (0,t)=ni (t).
16For related limiting results, but in stationary environments, see Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) and
Miao (2006). In a diﬀerent context, see Spulber (1996).
14and ai (t) ≥ 0 ,f o ri ∈ X,w h e r e







S ˆ Ui(a)dH0. The expectations operator, Ei, is taken with respect to the random
variables Tα and k(s),w h e r eTα − t is exponentially distributed with mean 1/α. The constant
K0 captures the utility of all investors before they trade for the ﬁrst time. The second term
in the objective function states that over an interval of time of length dt, there is a measure
αni(t)dt of investors of type i who can have their asset holdings rebalanced. An investor of
type i is assigned a quantity of assets ai(t). The planner’s choices must satisfy the resource
constraint (23) and the law of motion for the measure of investors of each preference type.17
The following proposition summarizes the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium is eﬃcient if and only if η =0 .
The equilibrium with bargaining is eﬃcient if and only if dealers have no bargaining power.
This bargaining ineﬃciency is reminiscent of the traditional holdup problem emphasized in
the investment literature. There is, however, a subtle diﬀerence. In our model the investor
and the dealer bargain over both an intermediation fee and the quantity of the asset that the
dealer trades on behalf of the investor. Hence, taking the behavior of the rest of the market
as given, the investment decision is pair wise Pareto-eﬃcient. The ineﬃciency arises because
when conducting a trade, the investor anticipates that the intermediation fee he will have to
pay to rebalance his asset holdings in his next encounter with a dealer will be increasing in the
gains from that future trade. As a result, at the margin, investors are discouraged from taking
positions that tend to lead to large asset reallocations in the future.
3.2 Steady state
Here we consider the limit of the equilibrium prices and allocations as t →∞ .
17Since investors access the market according to independent stochastic processes with identical distributions,
the measure of assets that can be reallocated among the α randomly drawn investors is α
U
adHt = αA.T h u s ,
the quantity of assets that can be reallocated among investors depends only on the mean of Ht, i.e., A,w h i c h
is given. Consequently, the planner’s decision of how to allocate assets at time t aﬀects neither the measure of
investors he will draw in the future nor the total measure of assets that these investors hold. In other words, Ht
is not a state variable for the planner’s problem.
15Proposition 3 For any H0, the equilibrium allocations and prices described in Deﬁnition
1, h{ai(t)},q(t),p(t),{φi(a,t)},H ti, converge to the unique steady-state allocations and prices
h{ai},q,p,{φi(a)},Hi, that satisfy
¯ u0
i (ai) ≤ q “ = ”i f ai > 0, (24)
I X
i=1



























Our notational convention is to omit the “t” argument in an endogenous variable whenever
we refer to its steady-state value. The expressions (24), (25) and (26) are the steady-state
counterparts of (12), (17) and (13), respectively.
In general, the individual state of an investor is a pair (a,j) ∈ R+×X,w h e r ea is his current
portfolio and j his current preference type. But according to (24), investors are only distributed
among I levels of asset holdings in the steady state. The reason is that any level of asset holdings
a such that a 6= ai for i ∈ X is transient, since whenever an investor adjusts his portfolio he
chooses a ∈ {ai}I
i=1. Thus, the set of ergodic states is {ai}I
i=1 ×X. In other words, the steady-
state measure H (A,I) is characterized by I2 mass points. When analyzing the steady state
we simplify the exposition and denote an individual investor’s state (ai,j) ∈ {ai}I
i=1 × X by
(i,j) ∈ X2. Hence, for state (i,j), i represents the portfolio the investor currently has (i.e.,
the one corresponding to the preference shock he had at the time he last rebalanced his asset
holdings), and j represents his current preference shock. We use nij to denote the steady-state
measure of investors in state ij,i . e . ,nij = H({ai},{j})=
R ∞











16Notice that ∂nij/∂α < 0 if j 6= i and ∂nii/∂α > 0, i.e., the measure of investors who are matched
to their desired asset positions increases with the rate at which investors get to rebalance their
asset holdings.
4 Asset positions, prices and trade volume
In this section we study the eﬀects of search frictions on individual asset holdings and derive
their implications for asset prices and trade volume. We focus on the steady state and specialize
the analysis to utility functions of the form ui(a)=εiu(a). For this class of preferences,
¯ ui (a)=¯ εiu(a),w h e r e¯ εi =
(r+κ)εi+δ¯ ε
r+κ+δ and ¯ ε =
PI
j=1 πjεj and (24) becomes18
¯ εiu0(ai)=rp.( 3 2 )
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The asset price, p,i sk e p tﬁxed in this calculation, so we are isolating the partial equilibrium
eﬀect of κ on individual demand. Note that ∂gi(κ;p)/∂κ has the same sign as εi − ¯ ε.T h a ti s ,
investors with a preference shock above average increase their demand when κ increases. An
agent with εi > ¯ ε anticipates that his preferences are likely to revert toward ¯ ε in the future,
and that when this happens, he may be unable to rebalance his asset position for some time.
Consequently, from (32), his choice of ai is lower than u0−1 (rp/εi), his choice of asset holdings
in a world with no trading delays. A larger α m e a n st h a ti tw i l lb ee a s i e rf o rt h ei n v e s t o rt oﬁnd
a dealer in the future; a lower η implies that it will be less costly to readjust his asset holdings
in the future. In both cases the investor assigns more weight to his current marginal utility
from holding the asset relative to its expected value. Conversely, investors with a preference
shock below average reduce their demand when κ increases. These endogenous responses of
individual investors’ asset demands have important implications for the way illiquid markets
operate. In Proposition 2 we have shown that this mechanism leads to allocative ineﬃciency
if dealers have any degree of bargaining power. Next, we show how these reallocation eﬀects
shape the implications of search frictions for asset prices and trade volume.
18For notational simplicity, we focus on interior solutions unless otherwise speciﬁed.
17Standard frictionless models emphasize two sets of factors that aﬀect the determination of
equilibrium asset prices, i.e., intrinsic properties of the asset and the characteristics of investors
who buy it. Search theory identiﬁes a third element: the manner in which the asset is traded,
i.e., the details of the micro structure of the asset market, such as the rate at which investors
meet dealers and the bargaining power of dealers. For example, suppose that the same asset
is traded in two segmented OTC markets that diﬀer only in the degree of market power of
the dealers that participate in each market. All else equal, would we expect the asset price to
be higher or lower in the market where dealers have more market power? In order to answer
these types of questions we oﬀer following proposition, which characterizes the eﬀects of search
frictions on asset prices.
Proposition 4 If −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is strictly increasing in a,t h e ndp/dκ > 0.I f−[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a)
is strictly decreasing in a,t h e ndp/dκ < 0.I f −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is independent of a,t h e n
dp/dκ =0 .
For a given p, the demands of investors with relatively low valuations (εi < ¯ ε) fall, while
those of investors with high valuations (εi > ¯ ε) rise. Whether an increase in κ raises the asset
price depends on the curvature of the individual demand for the asset as a function of ¯ εi,
i.e., ∂ai/∂¯ εi = −[u0(ai)]
2 /[u00(ai)rp], and hence on the curvature of the utility function. If
u(a)=l o ga then ai is linear in ¯ εi, and as one aggregates the individual changes in demands
induced by an increase in κ, the increases in ai (for investors with values of εi larger than ¯ ε)
and the decreases in ai (for investors with values of εi lower than ¯ ε) cancel each other out. As
a result, κ has no eﬀect on the aggregate demand for assets nor on the equilibrium price. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that trading frictions need not be reﬂected in asset prices.19
If u is not too concave, ai is a convex function of ¯ εi. For this case, Jensen’s inequality implies
that the increases in ai for relatively large values of εi outweigh the decreases in ai for relatively
low values of εi and the aggregate demand for the asset increases in response to an increase in
κ. In turn, this implies that the equilibrium price of the asset increases with κ. Conversely, the
asset price is decreasing in κ if u is suﬃciently concave. By specializing preferences further we
obtain the following corollary to Proposition 4.
Corollary 1 Let ui(a)=εia1−σ/(1−σ) with σ>0.I fσ>1 (< 1)t h e ndp/dκ < 0 (> 0)a n d
if u(a)=l o ga then dp/dκ =0 .
19For a related result, see Constantinides (1986), Gârleanu (2006) and Heaton and Lucas (1996).
18It is clear from (33) that regardless of the ultimate eﬀect of search frictions on the asset
price, an increase in κ makes high-valuation investors take on larger positions and low-valuation
investors take smaller positions. This seems to suggest that the distribution of asset holdings
will spread out if frictions are reduced. But this intuition based on (33) is only partial, because
(33) keeps the equilibrium asset price constant. We characterize the full equilibrium eﬀect of
search frictions on the distribution of asset holdings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let ui(a)=εia1−σ/(1−σ) with σ>0.A ni n c r e a s ei nκ causes the equilibrium
distribution of asset holdings to become riskier, in the second-order stochastic sense.
Proposition 5 conﬁrms that the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings across investors
becomes more disperse when trading frictions are reduced. This result is important to under-
s t a n dt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e ns e a r c hf r i c t i o n sa n dt r a d ev o l u m e .
Trade volume is a manifestation of the extent to which the market mechanism is able to
reallocate assets across investors. Large trade volumes are characteristic of liquid markets, i.e.,
markets where investors are able to switch in and out of asset positions relatively fast. Let V






nij |aj − ai|. (34)
An increase in κ has three distinct eﬀects on trade volume. First, the measure of investors
in any individual state (i,j) ∈ X2 who gain access to the market and are therefore able to
trade increases, which tends to increase trade volume. Second, the proportion 1 −
PI
i=1nii
of agents who are mismatched to their asset position–and hence the fraction of agents who
wish to trade–decreases, which tends to reduce trade volume. Finally, the distribution of asset
holdings spreads out, which tends to increase the quantity of assets traded in many individual
trades. With (30) and (34), it is possible to show that the ﬁrst two eﬀects combined lead to
an increase in V. While it is diﬃcult to sign the third eﬀect in general due to the general
equilibrium eﬀects of the price on asset holdings, we provide analytical results for two special
cases.
First, consider the model with I =2 –the case analyzed by DGP. In this case it is possible
to show that an increase in κ unambiguously leads to an increase in overall trade volume. This
is formalized in the following result, which is a corollary of Proposition 5.
19Corollary 2 Let ui(a)=εia1−σ/(1 − σ) with σ>0,a n dI =2 . Trade volume, V,i n c r e a s e s
with κ.
The second special case allows for richer heterogeneity in types, but adopts a speciﬁcation
of preferences for which the equilibrium asset price is independent of trading frictions. In this
case, we can get a sharp characterization of the eﬀects of market structure on the distribution
of trade sizes and on trade volume.
Proposition 6 Let ui(a)=εi lna. For any pair (κ,κ0) such that κ0 >κ , the distribution of
trade sizes associated with κ0 dominates the one associated with κ in the ﬁrst-order stochastic
sense.
The proof of Proposition 6 consists of showing that with logarithmic preferences, a reduction
in trading frictions increases the size of every trade, |ai − aj|. As a result, the volume of trade
unambiguously increases with κ.
5T r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s
The transaction costs borne by investors in OTC markets include the intermediation fees they
are charged by the dealers who intermediate their trades.20 In this section we study how
changes in trading frictions aﬀect intermediation fees. Our interest in these relationships is
twofold. First, intermediation fees and the implied bid-ask spreads are among of the most
common measures of market liquidity, since theyq u a n t i f yt h eo u t - o f - p o c k e tc o s t sb o r n eb yt h e
investors who trade in illiquid markets.21 Second, these fees are an important source of revenue
to the dealers who operate in these markets, and hence a key determinant of their incentives
to make markets and provide liquidity, a theme that we will explore in detail in Section 6.
Intermediation fees depend on the rate at which investors can contact alternative dealers,
on their bargaining power in bilateral negotiations and on the size of the trade (see (27)).
The following lemma shows that, keeping the characteristics of an investor and a dealer con-
stant, transaction costs–both total and per unit of asset traded–increase with the size of the
trade. As it turns out, this link between intermediation fees and trade size shapes the general
equilibrium eﬀects of changes in trading frictions on transaction costs.
20Transaction costs in OTC markets also include trading delays, which are the focus of Section 6.
21See footnote 12 and Section 7 for the theoretical link between intermediation fees and bid-ask spreads.
20Lemma 5 Consider an investor who holds asset position a ≥ 0 and wishes to trade ai −a>0.







In the general equilibrium, trading frequencies and bargaining power aﬀect transaction costs
through three channels. Consider, for example, the fee paid by an investor who currently has
preference type i, and whose preference type was j at the time of his last trade. A larger α tends
to reduce the fees that dealers can extract for any given trade size (it increases the denominator
of (27)). Intuitively, a larger α implies better search options for the investor–the competition
eﬀect of reduced trading frictions. An increase in α also changes the investor’s expected utility
from holding his current asset position, aj, relative to the expected utility from holding his
desired asset position, ai (it changes ¯ ui in (27)). This eﬀect may decrease or increase the fee
he pays depending on the speciﬁcv a l u e so faj and ai. Finally, α aﬀects the equilibrium levels
of the actual and desired asset positions aj and ai themselves. A larger α induces investors to
conduct larger asset reallocations every time they trade (see, e.g., Corollary 2 or Proposition 6).
By Lemma 5, this translates into larger fees for dealers, on average–the reallocation eﬀect of
reduced trading frictions. These three eﬀects can give rise to nonmonotonicities in the dealers’
incentives to make markets in response to changes in the degree of trading frictions. We
prove this result analytically for the case of “patient” traders, both for intermediation fees for
individual trades (Proposition 7) and for average intermediation fees (Corollary 3). Notice that
along a stationary equilibrium the only transactions that investors carry out involve trading
ai −aj,f o r(i,j) ∈ X2. We use this observation to simplify the exposition and use φji to denote
φi (aj).
Proposition 7 For each (i,j) ∈ X2,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ r>0, such that for all r<¯ r and η ∈ (0,1),
φji is non-monotonic in κ and it is largest for some κ ∈ (0,∞).
To interpret the ﬁnding in Proposition 7 consider the fees, φji, borne by investors who
currently have preference type i,a n dw h o s ep r e f e r e n c et y p ew a sj a tt h et i m eo ft h e i rl a s t
trade. Notice that such an investor holds asset position ai and engages in a trade that leaves
him with asset position aj, and that these asset positions are themselves functions of the
degree of trading frictions, κ. In very illiquid markets (κ → 0) investors hedge against future
preference shocks by choosing asset holdings that reﬂect their average utility from holding the
asset rather than their current utility at the time they trade. Consequently trade sizes are
small, which makes the intermediation fees that these agents pay, φji, also small. In very liquid
21markets (κ →∞ ) investors trade large quantities but the intermediation fees that they pay are
still small, because of favorable search options. For intermediate values of κ, trade sizes are
considerable and dealers eﬀectively have a signiﬁcant degree of market power which results in
relatively large intermediation fees.
Proposition 7 has implications for measures of market-wide transaction costs. Consider,
for instance, the average fee charged by dealers across the various types of trades, denoted Φ.
This average fee is also the expected revenue of an individual dealer conditional on meeting an
investor; it equals
PI





¯ ui (ai) − ¯ ui (aj)
r + κ
. (35)
The average fee, Φ, depends on the mismatch between investors’ desired and actual asset
positions, as measured by ¯ ui (ai) − ¯ ui (aj), as well as on the frequency with which they gain
access to the asset market. The following corollary of Proposition 7 is useful to understand the
dealers’ incentives to make markets, which will be the focus of the following section.
Corollary 3 There exists ˆ r>0, such that for all r<ˆ r and η ∈ (0,1), the dealers’ expected
revenue, Φ, is non-monotonic in κ and it is largest for some κ ∈ (0,∞).
According to Corollary 3, dealers are better oﬀ when they trade in markets which are neither
too liquid nor too illiquid, i.e., when κ is neither to large not too small. If κ is very large, dealers
would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to shift the trading activity to more illiquid markets, i.e., markets with
larger η or smaller α. Conversely if κ is very small, perhaps surprisingly, dealers would beneﬁt
from reductions in η and increases in α.
6 Endogenous execution delays
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n sw eh a v es h o w nh o wi n v e s t ors’ endogenous choices of asset positions
determine their eﬀective demand for liquidity. For instance, if frictions are severe (κ small),
desired and actual asset positions, {ai}, tend to be very close to each other, so investors’ trading
needs, and hence their demand for liquidity services, are small. In this section we allow for free
entry of dealers in order to endogenize the supply of liquidity services and the length of the
trading delays. We formalize the notion–common in the ﬁnance microstructure literature–
22that a dealer’s expected proﬁt depends on the competition for order ﬂow that he faces from
other dealers.22
Suppose that the Poisson rate at which an investor contacts a dealer, α, is a continuously
diﬀerentiable function of the measure of dealers in the market, υ,w i t hα(υ) a strictly increasing
and α(υ)/υ a strictly decreasing function of υ. We specify that α(0) = 0, limυ→∞ α(υ)=∞
and limυ→∞ α(υ)/υ =0 . Since all matches are bilateral and random, the Poisson rate at which
a dealer serves an investor is α(υ)/υ.F o r l a r g e r υ, each investor contacts dealers faster, but
the order ﬂow decreases for each individual dealer.
There is a large measure of dealers who can choose to participate in the market. Dealers
who choose to operate incur a ﬂow cost γ>0 that represents the ongoing costs of running
the dealership, e.g., exchange membership dues, the cost of searching for investors, advertising
their services and so on. Free-entry implies
α(υ)
υ Φ = γ, i.e., that the expected instantaneous







¯ ui (ai) − ¯ ui (aj)
r + α(υ)(1− η)
= γ. (36)
A steady-state equilibrium with free entry is a list h{ai},q,p,{φi(a)},{nji},υi that satisﬁes
(24)—(27), (30), (31) and (36), with α = α(υ).
Proposition 8 Assume η>0. There exists a steady-state equilibrium with free entry of deal-
ers, and it has υ>0.
Proposition 8 establishes the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with free entry provided
that dealers have some bargaining power. (Otherwise, intermediation fees would equal 0 in every
trade and dealers would be unable to cover their operation costs.) Figure 1 provides a typical
representation of a dealer’s expected proﬁt net of operation costs,
α(υ)
υ Φ − γ, as a function of
22See, for example, Harris (2003, p. 298):
“In competitive dealer markets, dealer spreads ultimately depend on the costs that dealers incur
in running their business. The free entry and exit of dealers ensures that spreads will adjust so
that dealers just earn normal proﬁts. When spreads are too high, their competition for order ﬂow
will cause spreads to fall, and as spreads fall, so do expected proﬁts.”
23O u rf r e ee n t r yo fd e a l e r si sa k i nt ot h ef r e ee n t r yo fﬁrms in Pissarides (2000). Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987) also assume free entry of dealers (or middlemen). See Wahal (1997) or Weston (2000) for an empirical
study of the determinants of entry and exit of market-makers in NASDAQ and their impact on spreads and the
level of trading activity, e.g., trade volume and the number of trades.
23the measure of dealers in the market. The average fee, Φ, is positive and bounded for all values
of υ, while the dealers’ contact rate goes to inﬁnity as υ approaches 0 and to zero as υ goes to
inﬁnity. Therefore, a dealer’s expected proﬁt is strictly positive for small υ and approaches −γ
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Figure 1: Multiple steady-state equilibria
The steady-state equilibrium with free entry need not be unique. While the measure of deal-
ers, υ, is strictly increasing in Φ, according to Corollary 3 the dealers’ expected revenue, Φ,c a n
itself be a non-monotonic function of α(υ). Faster trade means more competition among deal-
ers, which tends to reduce intermed i a t i o nf e e s .B u ta ni n c r e a s ei nα(υ) also induces investors
to take on more extreme asset positions which means that on average, dealers will interme-
diate larger asset reallocations and earn larger fees. The model will exhibit multiple steady
states if the second eﬀect is strong enough. (But for a given value υ, the rest of the equilibrium,
h{ai},q,p,{φi(a)},{nji}i, is uniquely determined as in the previous sections.) Generically there
is an odd number of steady-state equilibria.24
The type of strategic complementarity that leads to multiple equilibria in this model is of
ad i ﬀerent kind than the one often found in other models of search equilibrium. In particular
it is not due to increasing returns to scale in the meeting technology, as in Diamond (1982) or
24In our numerical examples we typically ﬁnd either one or three equilibria. (See Lagos and Rocheteau (2007)).
Note that the lowest and highest steady states in Figure 1 are “stable” in the following heuristic sense: if one
perturbates slightly the measure of dealers from its steady-state value, free entry tends to bring the measure of
dealers back towards its steady-state value.
24Vayanos and Weill (2007). In fact, our assumption ∂ [α(υ)/υ] < 0 implies that dealers reduce
the rate at which other dealers contact investors. What is key in our model is the liquidity
externality generated by the way in which the dealers’ incentives to make markets interact with
the investors’ unrestricted asset holding decisions. The equilibrium would be unique without
this general equilibrium eﬀect that operates through the endogenous shifts in investors’ asset
holdings in response to changes in the degree of trading frictions.
I nt h ec a s eo fm u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a ,t h em a r k e tc a nb es t u c ki nal o w - l i q u i d i t ye q u i l i b r i u m
where few dealers enter and investors engage in relatively small transactions. The low-liquidity
equilibrium exhibits large spreads, small trade volume and long trade-execution delays. Thus,
tight spreads are correlated with large volume and short trading delays across equilibria. Steady-
state welfare across equilibria increases with the measure of dealers. The high and low equilibria
share the following comparative statics: a decrease in the participation cost of dealers raises
the measure of dealers in the market. If the decrease in the participation cost is large enough,
the multiplicity of equilibria can be removed. (The expected proﬁt sc u r v ei nF i g u r e1s h i f t s
upward.) For the case of patient traders, the following proposition shows that the model
necessarily exhibits multiple steady-state equilibria if α(υ)/υ i sn o tt o oe l a s t i ca n dt h ed e a l e r ’ s
cost of operation is in some intermediate range.
Proposition 9 Assume η ∈ (0,1) and α(υ)=υθ,w i t hθ ∈ (0,1).T h e r ee x i s t˜ r>0, ˜ θ ∈ (0,1),
γ>0 and γ ∈ (0,γ) such that for all (r,θ) ∈ (0, ˜ r) × (˜ θ,1), there are multiple steady-state
equilibria if γ ∈ (γ,γ).
The presence of multiple equilibria due to the strategic interactions between investors and
intermediaries may not be a mere theoretical curiosity. Biais and Green (2005), for example,
document that the liquidity of the bond market on the NYSE dried up in the 1920’s for municipal
bonds and in the 1940’s for corporate bonds, and attribute the ensuing shift in the structure of
the market for bonds to “externalities in liquidity provision and strategic behavior by ﬁnancial
intermediaries.”25
25Pagano (1989) provides a well-known model of multiple equilibria in a ﬁnancial market. Both the model and
the economic mechanisms that can give rise to multiplicity in his setup are quite diﬀerent from the ones we are
presenting here.
256.1 Eﬃciency
We investigate the eﬃciency properties of equilibrium with free entry of dealers. The dynamic
planner’s problem is complex since the measure of dealers at any point in time will typically
depend on the whole distribution Ht(a,i), not just its mean. To keep the analysis manageable,
here we consider the case where the discount rate is close to 0, i.e., we characterize the allocation









nijai = A,( 3 7 )
where the steady-state distribution {nij} satisﬁes (30) and (31). The planner maximizes the
population-weighted sum of investors’ utilities from holding the asset, net of the participation
costs of the dealers and taking into account that the stationary distribution {nij} depends on
the measure of dealers, υ.
Proposition 10 Assume r ≈ 0. An equilibrium with free-entry is eﬃcient if and only if η =0
and υα0(υ)/α(υ)=η.
As before, investors’ asset holdings are eﬃcient if and only if dealers have no bargaining
power. Entry introduces an additional ineﬃciency: when a dealer enters the market, he imposes
a negative externality on other dealers’ order ﬂow. As it is well-known since Hosios (1990), these
externalities are internalized if and only if the elasticity of the contact technology α(υ) coincides
with dealers’ bargaining power. Since there is no free-entry equilibrium with υ>0 when η =0 ,
an equilibrium with entry is always ineﬃcient.
7M o r e o n s p r e a d s
The bid-ask spread is a key dimension of ﬁnancial liquidity: it constitutes the investors’ main
out-of-pocket cost of trading and it determines the dealers’ incentive to make markets. In
this section we parametrize the steady state of the model of Section 2 and conduct numerical
simulations that complement our previous analysis of transaction costs.
26Consider an investor with asset holdings ai who trades quantity aj − ai 6=0 .T h eeﬀective
transaction price he pays (or receives if aj − ai is negative) is
ˆ pij = p +
φij
aj − ai
per unit of the asset. This eﬀective transaction price can be interpreted as a bid price if the
investor sells (aj −ai < 0) and as an ask price if he buys.26 The price in the interdealer market
is a natural benchmark against which to assess the cost of a trade since it is the price that an
investor would pay if he had direct access to the market. The transaction cost to the investor
p e rd o l l a rt r a d e di st h e n(ˆ pij − p)/p = φij/p(aj − ai), which is sometimes referred to as the
liquidity premium.
In our model there is not a single bid-ask pair: bid and ask prices vary with an investor’s
asset holdings and preference type. The average eﬀective spread, S, is a measure of marketwide
trading costs often used in empirical work. It averages the bid and ask prices (expressed as







nij |ai − aj|
P









We study the eﬀects of changes in α on S by means of a numerical example. We normalize
the stock of assets by setting A =1 , let a unit of time correspond to a day and take the rate of
time preference to be 10 percent per year, i.e., r =0 .1/360.W es e tδ =1 /7 so that investors
receive one preference shock every week on average, and take the average execution delay to be
one day, i.e., α =1 .27 We assume that dealers and investors have equal bargaining power, i.e.,
η =0 .5.W el e tui (a)=εi lna.28 T h es u p p o r tf o rt h ev a l u e so fεi is {εi}
I
i=1 = { i−1
I−1}I
i=1 with




j=1 λj−1/(j − 1)!
, (39)
with λ =2 5 , which approximates a Normal distribution.
26This is in line with the equivalent formulation of the bargaining problem discussed in footnote 12.
27Trading delays in corporate bond markets range from a minute to a day, according to Saunders, Srinivasan
and Walter (2002, p. 97).
28We know from Corollary 1 that in this case the asset price is independent of α. This speciﬁcation is convenient
because it will allow us to interpret the results corresponding to diﬀerent values of α as corresponding to diﬀerent
markets with various degrees of trading frictions, or to diﬀerent groups of investors with various individual contact
rates with dealers.
27Figure 2: Spreads
The left panel of Figure 2 plots S for values of α ranging from 0 to 5.T h ee ﬀective spread
decreases as trading delays are reduced. If we think of bond markets as being more “opaque”
(i.e., they have lower α and higher η)t h a ne q u i t ym a r k e t s ,t h i si sc onsistent with several studies
that have found that bond trades are substantially more expensive than equity trades.29 The
theoretical prediction is also in accordance with the observation that the adoption of electronic
trading in equity markets has led to smaller spreads.30
Our model also has a rich set of predictions for individual transaction costs. The middle
panel of Figure 2 displays the liquidity premium corresponding to each transaction, i.e., the
pairs {(aj − ai,φ ij/p|ai − aj|)}i,j=1,...,I. The right panel of Figure 2 plots the bid and ask prices
for all trades as a function of the size of the trade, i.e., the pairs {(|aj − ai|, ˆ pij)}
I
i,j=1,f o rt w o
diﬀerent values of α (the crosses correspond to α =1and the circles to α =5 ).
As illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 2, the liquidity premia, φji/p|ai − aj|,i n c r e a s e
with the distance between aj and ai. Similarly, the right panel shows that the model generates
an increasing relationship between trade size and the bid and ask prices for given α.T h e s e
results are consistent with the empirical evidence on equity markets (e.g., Boehmer (2005, Table
29See Harris and Piwowar (2006) and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2005) for evidence on municipal and
corporate bond markets, respectively.
30See Stoll (2006) and Section 8 below.
287, Panel B)) and the foreign exchange markets (Burnside et al. (2006, Table 12)), where larger
trades pay larger transaction costs. These ﬁndings can be interpreted as instances of price
concession–the commonly recognized fact that traders in illiquid markets often move prices
against themselves in order to ﬁll large orders.
Some empirical studies on municipal and corporate bond markets document that larger
trades tend to be executed at a discount (Harris and Piwowar (2006) and Edwards, Harris and
Piwowar (2004)). This pattern is often attributed to the fact that larger trades tend to be
conducted by more “sophisticated” traders, i.e., traders who are better informed about trading
opportunities or have stronger bargaining positions.31 One can interpret the right panel of
Figure 2 as a plot of the collection of individual spreads in an economy with heterogenous
investors, some of which can contact dealers faster than others. Interestingly, sophisticated
investors (here those who contact dealers with a larger Poisson intensity) trade larger quantities
but pay lower spreads than less sophisticated investors. So our model can rationalize the eﬀects
on trade sizes and spreads that have been attributed to heterogeneity in the investors’ degree
of sophistication.32
Finally, note that the middle and right panels show that the model generates a distribution
of transaction costs, not only across trade size categories, but also among trades of equal size,
which is in accordance with the evidence from the market for municipal bonds (e.g., Green,
Holliﬁeld and Schurhoﬀ (2006a)). This heterogeneity arises in the model because–with the
two key features of OTC markets, trading delays and bargaining–two trades of equal size can
pay diﬀerent per-unit fees since the associated gains from trade may be diﬀerent for the two
trades.33
8M a r k e t r e f o r m s
Over the last few years ﬁnancial markets have been in the midst of a technological revolution.
The advent of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs)–private electronic screen-based
31According to Green, Holliﬁeld and Schurhoﬀ (2006a, p.1), “... some buyers appear to know which bonds are
on ‘sale’ at a given point in time, and others do not.” Green, Holliﬁeld and Schurhoﬀ (2006b) estimate dealers’
bargaining power and ﬁnd that it is higher for small to medium sized trades.
32In the theories of the bid-ask spread based on informational asymmetries, informed traders tend to trade
larger quantities but they also face larger spreads. See, e.g., Easley and O’Hara (1987).
33Notice that in our parametrized example, |ai − aj| = |ak − a | whenever |i − j| = |k −  |,s ot h e r ea r em a n y
trades of identical size which have diﬀerent associated gains from trade. Other parametrizations may have the
property that a diﬀerent |ai − aj| corresponds to each (i,j) pair with i 6= j. But in such cases, analogously to
what we ﬁnd here, there will typically be trades of similar size but very diﬀerent gains from trade.
29trading systems built around computer algorithms that match buy and sell orders through
an open limit-order book–is allowing investors to ﬁnd trading opportunities more rapidly, and
sometimes even directly, without the intervention of traditional intermediaries. The widespread
use of these new technologies has the potential to accelerate trade execution and drastically
reduce the transaction costs borne by investors.34
While these technological innovations were underway, several regulatory order-handling re-
forms were introduced in ﬁnancial markets to foster competition among securities dealers and
reduce their market power.35 These reforms have in many cases eﬀectively granted investors
direct access to interdealer markets, opening up the possibility that they may trade directly
with other investors, circumventing dealers.36 In this section we analyze the implications of
these technological and regulatory transformations and relate our theoretical ﬁndings to the
existing empirical literature. We ﬁrst extend our model by allowing investors periodic direct
access to the interdealer market. We then discuss the eﬀects of changes in the degree of market
power of dealers, which captures the eﬀects of the various eﬀorts (e.g., decimalization, pressures
to reduce spreads) to reduce their ability to charge large spreads.
8.1 ECNs
Suppose that in addition to periodically meeting dealers, investors get periodic direct access to
the competitive interdealer market. This formulation captures the increased competition for
order ﬂow from ECNs faced by dealers as a result of the order-handling regulatory changes.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that investors can access the competitive market either through a dealer,
34See Stoll (2006) and Allen et al. (2001) for an account of the emergence of ECNs in U. S. equity and
ﬁxed-income markets, respectively.
35See Barclay et al. (1999) for a detailed description of the New Order Handling Rules that were introduced by
the Securities Exchange Commission. These regulatory reforms followed the Christie and Schultz (1994) ﬁnding
that NASDAQ dealers avoided odd-eighth quotes in 70 of the largest 100 NASDAQ stocks in 1991, which led
them to argue that dealers tacitly colluded to keep bid-ask spreads wide.
36Before the implementation of the order-handling reforms, all NASDAQ order ﬂow had to be routed to some
NASDAQ dealer who could trade through or ahead of the investors’ orders, so investors were unable to bypass
dealers who quoted wide spreads. In addition, NASDAQ dealers had exclusive access to an ECN (SuperMontage)
that eﬀectively acted as an interdealer market outside the reach of regular investors, allowing dealers to quote
one set of prices for retail customers on NASDAQ while oﬀering more favorable prices to other marketmakers
on the ECN. Under the new order-handling rules, if a dealer places an order on an ECN, the price and quantity
a r ei n c o r p o r a t e di nt h eE C Nq u o t ed i s p l a y e do nN A S D A Q. Also, the investors’ orders can now be routed to
the interdealer ECN, and can compete directly with the NASDAQ dealers’ quotes. These days many other
interdealer markets are open to investors, examples include the trading platforms BrokerTec and E-Speed.
30whom they contact with Poisson rate α, or directly, with Poisson rate β.37 The Bellman
equation for Vi(a) can be shown to satisfy (6) with κ = α(1 − η)+β. The steady-state
distribution (nij)I
i,j=1 is given by (30)-(31) where α is replaced by α + β. Equilibrium exists
a n di su n i q u eb yP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
From Proposition 7 and Corollary 3, we know that an increase in β can have non-monotonic
eﬀects on transaction costs and dealers’ revenue. In particular, if the market is initially very
illiquid (α small or η large), then a regulatory or technological change that grants investors
direct access to the interdealer market will increase the dispersion of investors’ asset holdings
and increase the distribution of trade sizes. In turn, this can increase the dealers’ incentives to
make markets and hence the endogenous level of intermediation–despite the fact that they are
subjected to more intense competition for order ﬂow. We formalize this as follows.
Proposition 11 If η =1 , there exists a unique equilibrium with entry, and it has υ>0.T h e r e
is ¯ r>0 such that for all r<¯ r, υ is nonmonotonic in β.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra l lr<¯ r, υ is largest
for some β ∈ (0,∞).
The proof follows immediately from Proposition 8 and Corollary 3, so we omit it.38 When β
is small, investors of all types choose asset holdings very close to A so dealers have no incentive
to participate in market-making. As β increases, the resulting increase in the dispersion of
the distribution of asset holdings leads to larger trades on average, which stimulates the entry
of dealers. So in contrast to what casual intuition might suggest, the level of intermediation
need not be decreasing in the degree of competition for order ﬂow faced by dealers. This
ﬁnding is interesting because in the midst of the recent regulatory and technological changes,
concerns have been raised that increased competition from alternative trading networks could
37In this formulation, whether a trade is conducted through a dealer or directly in the interdealer market is
determined exogenously. Notwithstanding, notice that the eﬀects of competition between these modes of trading
manifest themselves in the equilibrium prices and allocations. For example, if β increases, this subjects dealers
to more competition and aﬀects the distribution of trade sizes and bid-ask spreads. Miao (2006) studies a model
where investors can choose to trade in a centralized market intermediated by market-makers or in a decentralzied
market where traders search for counterparties, and therefore he makes the competition among these markets
explicit. Another diﬀerence is that in our model investors continuously cycle between being buyers and sellers,
while in Miao (2006) agents trade once, exit the market and get replaced by new agents.
38To highlight the main point, the proposition specializes to the case of η =1because equilibrium is unique
in this case. To see this notice that η =1implies that {¯ ui (·)} and {ai} are independent of α. In this case
t h ea v e r a g ef e eo n l yd e p e n d so nα(υ) through the distribution of investors. As the number of dealers increases,
a larger measure of investors hold their desired portfolios, which reduces dealers’ opportunities to intermediate
trades. Thus, Φ is strictly decreasing in α (and υ) and the left side of (36) is strictly decreasing in υ,w h i c h
implies uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium with entry.
31reduce dealers’ incentives to make markets, adversely aﬀecting the liquidity of the market.
Weston (2000, 2002) ﬁnds that the increase in competition resulting from the growth of trading
through ECNs in NASDAQ has resulted in larger trade volumes, tighter bid-ask spreads per
dollar traded and net entry of market-makers, which can be rationalized by Proposition 11.39
Interestingly, in cases in which multiple equilibria exist (see Proposition 9), one can show
that a reduction in trading frictions can remove the multiplicity. Thus, perhaps counter to
intuition, it is possible that a mild regulatory reform or a technological innovation that gives
investors more direct access to the asset market leads to a relatively large increase in market
liquidity and even result in a higher volume of intermediated trades.
8.2 Dealers’ market power
As we mentioned above, many of the regulatory reforms implemented in the 1990’s were intended
to reduce the dealers’ ability to charge large spreads.40 Within the context of our model, η
captures the eﬀects of regulations and other details of the market structure that determine a
dealer’s ability to extract a rent in their trades with investors. As we noted in the previous
section, κ = α(1 − η)+β,s ot h ee ﬀects of a decrease in η a r ee s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m ea st h ee ﬀects
of an increase in β, namely, a larger trade volume and a smaller eﬀective spread.41
So far we have focused on the steady-state eﬀects of changes in policy and market structure
on market liquidity. We now use the model with a ﬁxed measure of dealers to illustrate how
market reforms, in particular changes in the degree of market power of dealers, aﬀect the
dynamics of the diﬀerent dimensions of market liquidity. We focus on the behavior of trade
39Barclay et al. (1999) also ﬁnd that spreads fell signiﬁcantly in NASDAQ in response to the order handling
reforms of the 1990’s without adversely aﬀecting quality of execution. Similarly, Stoll (2006) documents that
the widespread use of electronic trading in stock markets has led to tighter bid-ask spreads per dollar traded,
larger trade volume and larger total revenue for securities ﬁrms. See Allen, Hawkins and Sato (2001) and Weston
(2002) for references to related work.
40Decimalization is an example of such a policy. Up to the 1990’s, US stocks had been priced in units of 1/8
of a dollar. Partly in response to the impact of the ﬁndings of Christie and Schultz (1994), Congress passed the
Common Cents Pricing Act of 1997, which required the minumum tick size to be a penny. The tick size sets
a ﬂoor on how narrow the spreads can become. So, in principle, this decimalization would foster competition
among dealers. During that period there were also more direct pressures on dealers to reduce spreads. For more
on this, see the accounts in Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994) and Hasbrouck (2004).
41In Lagos and Rocheteau (2007) we use a special case of the model with free entry to show that a reduction in
η can lead to a decrease in eﬀective spreads, an increase in trade volume and at the same time stimulate dealer
entry and reduce execution delays. There we also show that provided that the initial market power of dealers is
large enough, a reduction in η also increases welfare, which may lend some theoretical support for the regulatory
reforms of the 1990’s.











S |ai(t) − a|dHt
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Consider an economy where dealers have market power η0, which is initially at the corresponding
steady state. Let a0
i denote the asset position chosen by an agent with preference type i when
he reallocates his asset holdings in this steady state. The initial measure of investors with asset
holdings a0
i and preference type j is nij given by (30) and (31). We study an unanticipated
regulatory change at time t =0that permanently reduces the dealers’ market power from
η0 =0 .75 to 0.5 (the rest of the parameters are as in Section 7). Figure 3 shows the trajectories
for trade volume and the eﬀective spread.42
Figure 3: Eﬀects of a permanent and unanticipated change in η on market liquidity
Trade volume is higher in the new steady state, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.
The reason is that the distribution of trade sizes associated with η dominates in a ﬁrst-order-
stochastic-dominance sense the one associated with η0 >η(Proposition 6). Trade volume
overshoots its new steady-state level on impact. This is due to the evolution of the distribution
of trade sizes over time. At time 0 the support of the distribution of asset positions is {a0
i}I
i=1,
42Since the distribution of preference types remains constant, ni(t)=πi for all t,t h ee ﬀective cost of holding
the asset typically jumps instantly to its new steady-state level. In the case with σ =1 , the asset price, p,
is independent of η, so it remains constant. Since p(t) is constant for all t>0, ai(t) and φi (a,t) are also
independent of t.
33which coincides with the set of desired portfolios before the policy change, but the set of
investors’ desired portfolios becomes {ai}I
i=1 in response to the change in dealers’ bargaining
power. Hence, all investors adjust their asset holdings as they get access to the market, even
those who were holding their desired asset holdings before the market reform. Trade volume
approaches its new steady-state level as the measure of investors who have not contacted a dealer
since the market reform goes to 0. The right panel of Figure 3 shows the trajectory for the
eﬀective spread. Along the transition, the eﬀective spread undershoots its new, lower steady-
state level. This behavior is driven by the time-paths for trade volume and the distribution of
trade sizes.43 The adjustment process to the new steady state occurs fast in this example: the
equilibrium has essentially converged to the steady state after 5 days.
9 Related literature
Traders who operate in markets with OTC-style frictions will seek to mitigate these trading
frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs. Our previous
analysis has shown that this a critical aspect of investor behavior in illiquid markets. To
illustrate this point, in this section we derive the main predictions of a version DGP’s model and
contrast them with those of a special case of our formulation. This comparison will underscore
the fact that the type of “liquidity hedging” that we have identiﬁed–and that only becomes
possible with unrestricted asset holdings–generates new insights on how trading frictions shape
the various dimensions of market liquidity, alters the empirical predictions of the theory, and
leads to a diﬀerent assessment of their normative implications.
We will contrast the empirical predictions of DGP’s model with those of a special case of
our model with X = {1,2} and ui (a)=εi
a1−σ
1−σ for i ∈ X and σ>0.W ef o c u so nt h ev e r s i o no f
DGP’s model with no inter-investor meetings (e.g., the version that DGP use in their Theorem
4 and part (i) of Theorem 6). DGP restrict a ∈ {0,1} and let uij denote the ﬂow utility
of an investor with asset position i ∈ {0,1} and preference type j ∈ {0,1}.44 DGP assume
43To get a sense for the dynamics of the distribution of trade sizes, ﬁrst note that all investors are mismatched
with their asset positions in the aftermath of the market reform. The trades conducted along the transition path
by investors who in the absence of the policy change would have been holding their desired asset position have
sizes
 ai − a
0
i
 , which tend to be smaller than the trade sizes |ai − aj|, i.e., the only ones that will be carried out
in the new steady state. Since spreads increase with trade size (Lemma 5), the dynamics of the distribution of
trade sizes tends to make the eﬀective spread low initially.
44DGP state their restriction on asset holdings as a ∈ [0,1] but only study equilibria in which agents hold
either 0 or 1 unit of the asset, which is eﬀectively equivalent to imposing the restriction a ∈ {0,1}.
34u00 = u01 =0 , so for comparison purposes, we do the same hereafter. To simplify the notation,
in both models we let π denote the steady-state fraction of investors with high valuation.45









1−π} in DGP. The latter is independent of the dealers’ bargaining power, η,
and of all preference parameters and holding payoﬀs( e . g . ,r, k). In contrast, these parameters
are critical determinants of trade volume in our theory, as they inﬂuence the investors’ choices
of asset holdings (the second factor in V). As discussed in Section 8, our model predicts–in
accordance with available evidence–that markets in which dealers have less market power will
tend exhibit larger trade volume.46
Price. Since asset holdings are indivisible in DGP, equilibrium in the interdealer market
requires investors who are on the long side of the market to be indiﬀerent between trading and
not trading. It is easy to show that in steady state investors who want to sell are on the short










r+κ+δ if π<A ,
(40)
where ¯ u ≡ π1u11 + π0u10.47
The asset holding restrictions in DGP are also the reason why the asset price in their theory
is independent of the stock of assets, A, for any A<πand for any A>π ,w i t had i s c o n t i n u i t ya t
A = π. In contrast, the asset price in our model is smooth and decreasing in A. For example, in







The behavior of the asset price in response to changes in the trading frictions in DGP depends
critically on the level of A. From (40), p is increasing in α (decreasing in η)i fA<πbut
decreasing in α (increasing in η)i fA>π . In contrast, with unrestricted asset holdings these
extensive-margin considerations are irrelevant to assess the impact of trading frictions on the
asset price (recall Proposition 4).
45“High valuation” corresponds to the index “2” in our formulation and “1”i nD G P .
46Apart from these qualitative diﬀerences, the theory with unrestricted portfolios also has diﬀerent quantitative
implications for the relationship between trade volume and trading frictions. For example, DGP’s model has a
sharp empirical implication: the elasticity of trade volume with respect to trading frictions equals
δ
α+δ ∈ (0,1).
In contrast, in the model with unrestricted asset holdings the corresponding elasticity is larger by an amount that
equals the elasticity of (a2 − a1) with respect to α–which is positive, capturing the notion that each investor
wishes to conduct a larger trade when frictions are reduced.







and the equilibrium price in the interdealer market is indeterminate.
48Notice that we obtain DGP’s formulation with A<πas a special case of ours when σ → 0.
35A paper that is closely related to ours is an independent contribution by Gârleanu (2006),
which studies the asset pricing implications of infrequent (Poisson) trading opportunities. Some
of our ﬁndings are similar: like us, he ﬁnds that investors take more extreme positions when
trading delays are short. Also, Gârleanu stresses that the asset price is not aﬀected by the
trading frictions–which is true in our model for a particular speciﬁcation of the utility function
(see Corollary 1). In terms of diﬀerences, trades in Gârleanu (2006) are not intermediated by
dealers (α =0in our formulation) so he could not consider the implications of execution delays
for transaction costs and dealers’ incentives to provide liquidity, which are at the center of our
analysis.
Transaction costs. DGP’s transaction costs can be expressed in terms of the intermediation
fees φ01 and φ10 that dealers charge investors who want to buy and sell, respectively. The equi-
librium spread is s =
η(u11−u10)
r+κ+δ .49 Conditional on having contacted an investor, the expected




1−π}s.T h i s
key determinant of dealers’ incentives to make markets is decreasing in the investors’ contact
rate with dealers, α, and increasing in the dealers’ bargaining power, η. In contrast, as we
have shown analytically in Proposition 3, in our model with no restrictions on asset holdings
it is natural for the average fee to be nonmonotonic in α and η. Our theory suggests that
these nonmonotonicities can be important. From an applied standpoint, they help explain how
OTC markets have reacted to recent changes in their market structure (Section 8). From a
theoretical standpoint, they can generate self-fulﬁlling liquidity shortages in markets with free
entry of dealers (Section 6).50
Another key diﬀerence with DGP is the fact that since the equilibrium in the model with
unrestricted portfolios implies a nondegenerate distribution of trade sizes, our theory has pre-
dictions for the relationship between transaction costs and transaction sizes. As we showed
49Since asset holdings in DGP are restricted to lie in {0,1},e v e r yt r a d ei so fs i z e1 and hence φ01+φ10 = s.I n
addition, the indivisibility assumption implies that dealers either charge a fee on asset sales or on asset purchases,
but not both. Speciﬁcally, if A<πthen φ01 =0and investors only pay a fee φ10 = s when they sell. Conversely,
if π<A , φ10 =0and investors only pay a fee φ01 = s when they buy.
50The spread, s,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nα and increasing in η in this version of DGP with no inter-investor meetings.
One can also verify that the average eﬀective spread weighted by the sizes of each trade and expressed as
ap r o p o r t i o no ft h ep r i c ei sa l s od e c r e a s i n gi nα and increasing in η. The behavior of this measure of the
marketwide spread, i.e., (38), is much more complicated in our model, where the investors’ expected holding
payoﬀs, their individual asset demands, the asset price, and the whole distribution of asset holdings change in
response to a change in α. Our numerical work, some of which we have reported in Section 7, is in accordance
with the predictions of DGP.
36in Lemma 5 and illustrated in Section 7, transaction costs are increasing in the size of the
transaction. Thus, if ai−aj >a i−ak > 0, then the eﬀective price at which the investor buys is
ˆ pji > ˆ pki, i.e., he eﬀectively pays higher prices when he conducts larger purchases. Conversely,
ˆ pji < ˆ pki if ai − aj <a i − ak < 0,i . e . ,h ee ﬀectively receives lower prices when he conducts
larger sales. In other words, the theory with unrestricted asset holdings naturally generates
instances of price concession which are commonplace in OTC markets.51
Execution delays. DGP endogenized trading delays by allowing a single monopolist dealer
to choose search intensity once-and-for-all at the beginning of time. Free entry of competing
dealers or market-makers is a feature of most OTC markets, however, the implications of this
microstructure have not yet been explored in the literature. We ﬁnd that allowing for free entry
of dealers is a natural way to endogenize execution delays and the amount of liquidity supplied by
dealers, and that it provides an important channel through which changes in market conditions
aﬀect transaction costs and trade volume (Section 8). In addition, the interaction between
free entry and unrestricted asset holdings leads to a natural kind of strategic complementarity
that can help rationalize self-fulﬁlling liquidity shortages in markets with OTC-style frictions
(Section 6).
Welfare. The equilibrium allocation is always constrained eﬃcient in the baseline model
of DGP–regardless of the value of η–which stands in contrast to the ﬁnding we report in
Proposition 2. The reason is that in our model investors choose asset holdings, while this
intensive margin is absent in DGP. For the same reason, the ineﬃciency result we ﬁnd in
Proposition 10 also has no counterpart in DGP.
10 Conclusion
We developed a search-theoretic model of an asset market and have used it to analyze the
relationship between the fundamental trading frictions characteristic of OTC markets (trading
delays, dealers’ market power) and standard measures of ﬁnancial liquidity, such as the size of
bid-ask spreads, trade volume and execution delays. We have shown that the theory can be
used to analyze the positive and normative implications of recent regulatory and technological
innovations in trading.
51See Section 4.3 in Harris (2003).
37From a methodological standpoint, our work shows that by imposing severe restrictions on
asset holdings, existing search-based theories of ﬁnancial liquidity neglect a critical aspect of
investor behavior in illiquid markets, namely the fact that market participants can mitigate
trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs. We have
found that this mechanism, which eﬀectively amounts to incorporating a demand for liquidity at
the investor level absent in previous work, has important implications for market eﬃciency and
t h ew a yi nw h i c ht r a d i n gf r i c t i o n ss h a p ea s s e tp r i c e sa sw e l la st r a d ev o l u m e ,b i d - a s ks p r e a d s
and trading delays–precisely the dimensions of market liquidity which search-based theories
of ﬁnancial liquidity were designed to explain.
The model we have developed allows for fairly general forms of investor heterogeneity and
it has relatively few parameters that map naturally into observables. One could easily imagine
calibrating or estimating the model using data on trade execution in OTC markets. We think
that much could be learned from such exercises. For example, one could quantify the welfare
gains associated with a given reduction in trading frictions, and the impact that the introduction
of electronic trading networks will have on bid-ask spreads, average execution times, trade
volume and other standard measures of liquidity. Various extensions are worth considering.
First, there are many issues, such as the dynamic provision of liquidity by dealers who can hold
asset positions, that would require a more detailed study of the model dynamics. Second, as
an alternative to bilateral bargaining, one could explore alternative trading mechanisms that
combine price-posting and directed search which would correspond to the more transparent
market structures in the OTC spectrum.
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42AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . The Nash solution requires the outcome to be Pareto eﬃcient. Since
agents’ payoﬀs are linear in φ, ai(t) must maximize the surplus from the match, namely
Vi [ai(t),t] − Vi(a,t) − p[ai(t) − a]. This gives (3). Diﬀerentiating the Nash product in (2)
with respect to φ and equating to zero gives (4).













Let Tδ denote the next time the investor draws a new preference shock and Tδκ =m i n( Tδ,T κ).
Since preference shocks and eﬀective contacts with dealers follow independent Poisson processes,
Tδ −t, Tκ −t and Tδκ −t are exponentially distributed random variables with means 1/δ, 1/κ,




e−rsuk(t)(a)ds + I{Tδ<Tκ}e−r(Tδ−t) ¯ Uk(Tδ)(a)
¸
,
where the expectation is over the random variables Tδ − t, Tκ − t and Tδκ − t, conditional on
















r + κ + δ
. (42)
Since Tδ − t and Tκ − t are independent random variables, and k(Tδ)=j with probability πj
























r + κ + δ
I X
j=1
πj ¯ Uj(a). (43)
43Combine (42) and (43) to get
¯ Ui(a)=
ui(a)
r + κ + δ
+
δ
r + κ + δ
I X
j=1
πj ¯ Uj(a). (44)
Multiply (44) through by πi,a d do v e ri,s o l v ef o r
P
j πj ¯ Uj(a) and substitute this is expression





where ¯ ui (a) is as in (10).
(ii). The expected discounted price of the asset at the next time when the investor gets an




e−(r+κ)sp(t + s)ds. (46)
Finally, substitute (45) and (46) into (8) and multiply through by (r + κ) to obtain the formu-
lation of the investor’s problem in the statement of the lemma.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .(a) To obtain (13), rewrite (11) as
q(t)=( r + κ)p(t) − κe(r+κ)t
Z ∞
t
(r + κ)e−(r+κ)sp(s)ds (47)
and diﬀerentiate with respect to t.
(b) To arrive at (14), integrate (13) forward using the condition limt→∞ e−rtp(t)=0 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .We proceed in three steps: (i)d e r i v enji(τ,t),( ii)d e r i v en0
ji(A,t) and
(iii)o b t a i nHt(A,I) for an arbitrary (A,I) ∈ Σ.
Step (i). Since investors meet dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α,
the length of the time period between any time t and the next time the investor meets a dealer
is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 1/α. Thus, the density measure of
investors who last readjusted their asset holdings at time t − τ>0 is αe−ατ. The compound
Poisson process for preference shocks implies that the probability that an investor who last




πi + I{i=j}e−δτ. Since the measure of investors with preference type j at
time t−τ is nj(t−τ), and the Poisson process for meeting dealers and the compound Poisson
process for preference shocks are independent, the density measure of investors who last traded




nj (t − τ), as given by (19) and (20).
Step (ii). Let Tα denote the ﬁrst time an investor contacts a dealer. Since Tα is an ex-
ponentially distributed random variable, Pr(Tα >t )=e−αt.T h u s , e−αt is the measure of
investors who have not contacted a dealer up to time t. Since the Poisson meeting process is
independent of investors’ individual states, the time-t measure of investors whose asset holdings
and preference types lied in the set (A,{j}) at time 0 and who have not yet met a dealer at
time t is e−αtH0 (A,{j}). The measure of investors who were of preference type j at time
0 and are of type i at time t is
¡
1 − e−δt¢
πi + e−δtI{j=i}.T h u s , t h e t i m e - t measure of in-
vestors who at time 0 had preference type j and assets in A, whose preference type is i






H0(A,{j}), as given in (21).
(iii). Ht(A,I) is the measure of investors who have an individual state (a,i) ∈ (A,I) at





ji(A,t), namely those investors who never
contacted dealers but who were holding asset positions in the set A at time 0 and whose
preference types at t lie in I.T h e t i m e - t measure of investors of type i who chose an asset
position in the set A the last time they traded, given that their preference type at that time
was j,i s
R t
0 I{aj(t−τ)∈A}nji(τ,t)dτ. Thus, the second term in Ht(A,I), namely the measure
of investors who the last time they traded chose asset positions that belong to the set A and







P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . For all t ≥ 0, the distribution {ni(t)}I
i=1 is unique and given by
(16). Given that ui is strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable, (12) implies that any
interior choice ai(t) is a strictly decreasing, continuous function of q(t) for every i. Therefore,
the market-clearing condition (17) determines a unique q(t) for each t ≥ 0.G i v e nq(t),t h e r e
is a unique {ai(t)}I
i=1 that solves (12). Given q(t), (15) gives the fee φi(a,t) for every i and a.
Finally, given {ai(t)}I
i=1 the distribution Ht is given by (18).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Calculations similar to those contained in part (i) of the proof of
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ui[ai(t)] +
δ
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ui[ai(t)] +
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where λ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint. The planner’s
problem then reduces to ﬁnding, for each t, the sequence {ai(t)}
I
i=1 that solves max{ai(t)} L(t).
Since L(t) is strictly jointly concave in {ai(t)}
I
i=1,t h eﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for this problem are
(r + α)u0




r + α + δ
≤ λ(t),“ = ”i f ai(t) > 0,( 4 8 )




i [λ(t)] = A (49)
where a∗
i (λ) is the ai that satisﬁes (48). Comparing (49) with (17), (48) with (12), and setting
q(t)=λ(t), it becomes clear that (12) coincides with (48) if and only if η =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . From (16), limt→∞ ni(t)=πi for each i. Thus, condition (17)
becomes
PI





.W i t h t h i s ,







= A.G i v e nt h a t
ui is continuously diﬀerentiable for each i, this condition deﬁnes a unique q which is time-
invariant. Given this q, (12) implies a unique set of time-invariant optimal asset holdings
{ai}
I
i=1.T h u s , {ai}
I
i=1 and q satisfy (24) and (25). Given the fact that q(t)=q for all
t, (13) implies (26). Given q and {ai}
I
i=1, (15) implies (27), which determines the time in-
variant fees {φi (a)}
I
i=1. To derive the time-invariant limit of the measure of investors across
individual states, note that limt→∞ n0





πj ≡ nji(τ,∞) and limt→∞ aj (t − τ)=
aj,s olimt→∞ Ht (A,I)=H (A,I) for all (A,I) ∈ Σ.










46From (32), we know that the denominator of this expression is strictly positive, so we focus on
the sign of the numerator. Diﬀerentiate (32) to obtain ∂ai/∂κ, multiply by πi,a n da d do v e ra l l
















(εi − ¯ ε).
Suppose −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is strictly increasing in a.L e t¯ a denote the a that solves (32) for ¯ εi =¯ ε.
Then, note that −[u0(ai)]
2 (εi − ¯ ε)/u00(ai) ≥− [u0(¯ a)]
2 (εi − ¯ ε)/u00(¯ a) for each i, with strict




∂κ > 0 and consequently,
dp
dκ > 0. Similar
reasoning implies
dp
dκ < 0 if −[u0(a)]




is constant in a.


















From (50), the individual demand for the asset by an agent whose current preference shock is









Consider κ0 >κ . One can verify that there exists a unique ˜ ε ∈ (ε1,ε I) such that ai (κ0) >a i (κ)
for all εi > ˜ ε, ai (κ0) <a i (κ) for all εi < ˜ ε and ai (κ0)=ai (κ) ≡ ˜ a if εi =˜ ε.W i t h ( 3 0 )
and (31), the cumulative distribution of assets across investors for the economy indexed by κ,
is Gκ(a)=
PI
j=1 I{aj(κ)≤a}πj. This, and the fact that (κ0 − κ)[ai (κ0) − ai (κ)] > 0 iﬀ εi > ˜ ε
implies that Gκ0(a) ≥ Gκ(a) for all a<˜ a and Gκ0(a) ≤ Gκ(a) for all a>˜ a. Thus, given that
both distributions have the same mean and that aI (κ0) >a I (κ), the fact that the cumulative
density functions cross only once implies that Gκ dominates Gκ0 in the second-order stochastic
sense.




[a2 (κ) − a1 (κ)],
47where ai (κ) is given by (52). Since ε1 <ε 2,w eh a v ea1 (κ) <a 2 (κ), and diﬀerentiating (52)
with respect to κ implies
da1(κ)
dκ < 0 <
da2(κ)
dκ .T oﬁnd dV
dκ, we consider two cases. (i)A ni n c r e a s e





dκ > 0.( ii)
















Proof of Proposition 6. Since ui (a)=εi lna,w eh a v eai > 0 for all i,a n dai 6= aj unless
i = j. From (30), the proportion of trades that involve buying ai and selling aj or vice versa
(for i 6= j)i s(nij + nji)/(1 −
PI
i=1 nii)=2 πiπj/(1 −
PI
i=1 π2
i ), which is independent of κ.




δ (εi − εj)
rp(r + κ + δ)
2.
Thus, |ai − aj| = |gi(κ;p) − gj(κ;p)| increases with κ for all i 6= j. The measure of trades of











which is decreasing in κ.








i (a) − q
¤
.
Suppose that the nonnegativity constraint on ai is slack. Then, since ¯ ui is strictly concave and
¯ u0
i (ai) − q =0 , we know that ¯ u0
i (a) − q<0 i fa n do n l yi fa − ai > 0,a n d
∂φi(a)
∂a has the same
sign as a − ai.I fai =0 ,t h e na>a i and ¯ u0
i (a) − q<¯ u0
i (ai) − q ≤ 0,s o
∂φi(a)
∂a > 0 which is
the same sign as a − ai = a>0. This establishes part (i). To show part (ii), divide (27) by









r + α(1 − η)
∙
¯ ui (ai) − ¯ ui (a) − ¯ u0





which is negative for all a 6= ai,s i n c e¯ ui is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let q(κ,r), ai (κ,r) and φji(κ,r) denote, respectively, the equi-
librium q, ai and φji that solve the system (24), (25) and (27) for all i ∈ X. We proceed
48in three steps: (i) show that φji(κ,r) > 0 for all κ ∈ (0,∞) and all r ∈ [0,∞) provided
ai (κ,r) 6= aj (κ,r) and η>0;( ii) establish that limκ→∞ φji(κ,r)=0for any r ≥ 0 and all
(i,j) ∈ X2;( iii) show that for each κ ∈ (0,∞) there is ¯ r>0 such that φji(0,r) <φ ji(κ,r)
for all r ∈ (0, ¯ r). The nonmonotonicity of φji(κ,r) with respect to κ for all r ∈ [0, ¯ r) will then
follow from steps (i) through (iii).
(i). Since φij =
η
r+κ {maxa0 [¯ ui (a0) − qa0] − [¯ ui (aj) − qaj]},w eh a v eφij (κ,r) > 0 for all
κ ∈ (0,∞) and all r ∈ [0,∞),p r o v i d e dη>0 and aj 6=a r gm a x a0≥0 [¯ ui (a0) − qa0] (i.e., provided
the investor trades).
(ii). limκ→∞ q(κ,r)=¯ q and limκ→∞ ai (κ,r) = argmaxa0≥0 [ui (a0) − ¯ qa0] ≡ h∞




i (¯ q)=A, which in turn implies ¯ q ∈ (0,∞) and h∞
i (¯ q) < ∞. Therefore
limκ→∞ φji(κ,r)=0for any r ≥ 0 and all (i,j) ∈ X2.
(iii). Let κ → 0 to obtain q(0,r)=˜ q and ai (0,r)=a r g m a x a0≥0 [˜ ui (a0) − ˜ qa0] ≡ h0
i (˜ q),




k=1 ui (a) and ˜ q solves
PI
i=1 πih0
i (˜ q)=A.O b s e r v e t h a t
limr→0 ai (0,r)=˜ u0−1
i (˜ q)=A,f o re a c hi ∈ X. With this, apply L’Hôpital’s rule to ﬁnd
limr→0 φji(0,r)=0 .
Our assumptions on primitives imply that q(κ,r) and ai (κ,r) are continuous functions, so
φji(κ,r) is continuous. Hence, for each (i,j) with i 6= j a n da ne a c hκ ∈ (0,∞),t h e r ei ss o m e
¯ r>0 such that for all r ∈ [0, ¯ r),w eh a v elimκ→∞ φji(κ,r)=0<φ ji(κ,r) (by (i)a n d( ii))
and φji(0,r) <φ ji(κ,r) (by (i)a n d( iii)), which establishes the nonmonotonicity of φij with
respect to κ.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 .W r i t e Φ(α,η,r)=
PI
i,j=1 nji(α)φji[α(1 − η),r],w h e r enji(α) is
given by (30)—(31). Fix an arbitrary (α,η) ∈ (0,∞) × (0,1). From Proposition 7,
min
{(i,j)∈X2:i6=j}
φji[α(1 − η),r] > 0
for all r ∈ [0,∞),a n dt h e r ei sr0 > 0 such that for all r ∈ [0,r 0), max(i,j)∈X2 φji(0,r) <
min{(i,j)∈X2:i6=j} φji[α(1 − η),r]. Then, for any r ∈ [0,r 0),w eh a v elimα0→∞ Φ(α0,η,r)=0<
Φ(α,η,r) (by (ii)) and Φ(0,η,r) < Φ(α,η,r) (by (iii)), which establishes the nonmonotonicity
of Φ with respect to α, and therefore with respect to κ = α(1 − η).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .Using (10), we can write (35) as
Φ =
ηδ
(α + δ)[r + α(1 − η)+δ]
I X
i,j=1
πiπj [ui (ai) − ui (aj)].
49From (24) we know that ai is a continuous function of υ and q, i.e., ai = ai (υ,q).F r o m
(25), there is a unique q that clears the asset market and it is a continuous function of υ, i.e.,




i,j=1 πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]}
[α(υ)+δ][r + α(υ)(1 − η)+δ]
. (53)
This is the left-hand side of the free-entry condition (36). First, we establish that limυ→0 Γ(υ)=









r + κ + δ
− qaj (54)
holds for every i and j. Since (24) implies ai = aj if and only if ai = aj =0 ,( 5 4 )h o l d sw i t h
strict inequality for any i such that ai > 0. Multiplying this inequality through by πiπj and
summing over all i and j implies
PI
i,j=1 πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]} > 0. The inequality is strict
since for every υ we have ai > 0 at least for i = I. Then, limυ→0 Γ(υ)=∞ follows from η>0




[α(υ)+δ][r + α(υ)(1 − η)+δ]
= ∞.
Next, note that the fact that
PI
i,j=1 πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]} is bounded (because ai(υ) must




[α(υ)+δ][r + α(υ)(1 − η)+δ]
=0
implies that limυ→∞ Γ(υ)=0 . Finally, since Γ is continuous, there exists some υ ∈ R+ such
that Γ(υ)=γ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 .In an equilibrium with entry, the measure of dealers satisﬁes
Φ[α(υ),η,r]=γυ1−θ. (55)
From Proposition 3, there is ˜ r>0 such that γ ≡ Φ(0,η,r) < supυ Φ[α(υ),η,r] ≡ γ for all
r ∈ [0, ˜ r),a n dlimυ→∞ Φ[α(υ),η,r]=0<γ .N o t et h a ta sθ → 1, γυ1−θ converges uniformly
to γ on any closed interval [υ0,υ 1] ⊆ (0,∞). Thus, for any γ ∈ (γ,γ),t h e r ei sa˜ θ such that for
for all θ ∈ (˜ θ,1), there are multiple (at least three) values of υ>0 that satisfy (55).



















50where λ ∈ R+ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint
PI
i,j=1 nijai =










k(ai) ≤ λ,“ = ”i f ai > 0. (56)







k(ai),w h i c h
c o i n c i d e sw i t ht h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 5 6 )i fa n do n l yi fη =0 .T h eﬁrst-order condition for the





δπiπj [ui(ai) − uj(ai)]
α(υ)+δ
= γ. (57)





δπiπj [ui (ai) − ui (aj)]
α(υ)+δ
= γ,
which converges to (57) as η → 0 i fa n do n l yi fα0(υ)υ/α(υ)=η.




i,j=1 πiπj {ui[ai(β,r)] − ui[aj(β,r)]}
[α(υ)+β + δ](r + β + δ)
,
where ai (β,r) = argmaxa0≥0 [¯ ui(a0) − qa0] ≡ hi (q) for η =1and q solves
PI
i=1 πihi (q)=A.
Note that η =1implies ai (β,r) is independent of υ.L e t υ(β,r) denote the equilibrium
measure of participating dealers; it solves Γ(υ) − γ =0 . With arguments similar to those used
in Proposition 8, it can be shown that such a υ(β,r) exists and υ(β,r) > 0 for r>0.M o r e o v e r ,
υ(β,r) is unique since Γ0(υ) < 0.N o t et h a tlimβ→∞ υ(β,r)=0 , and since limr→0 ai (0,r)=A
for all i, limr→0 υ(0,r)=0 .S i n c e Γ is continuous in r,f o rag i v e nβ there is ¯ r>0 such
that υ(0,r) <υ(β,r) and limβ0→∞ υ(β0,r) <υ(β,r) for all r ∈ (0, ¯ r).T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s t h e
nonmonotonicity of υ with respect to β.
51B Transversality condition
In this appendix we show that an equilibrium, the asset price p(t) necessarily satisﬁes the
condition limt→∞ e−rtp(t)=0 , which we used in part (b)o fL e m m a2 .T h ep r o o fw eo ﬀer here
is an adapted version of a similar proof that appears in Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007).
Consider an investor who eﬀectively contacts the market with Poisson intensity κ.L e t
{Tn}∞
n=1 denote the sequence of contact times and Nt the number of contacts over the time
interval [0,t). We adopt the convention that T0 =0(but T0 is not a contact time). An asset
plan, a, for the investor speciﬁes his asset holdings as a function time, s, and his history of
preference shocks and contact times, hk(s),{Tn}∞
n=1i for s ≥ 0.L e ta = a(s) denote an asset
plan. An asset plan is feasible if a(s)=a(Tn) for all s ∈ [Tn,T n+1) and a(0) = a0 > 0,w h i c hi s
given. Let V t
i (a,0) be the expected discounted utility over the time interval [0,t) of an investor
with preference type i at time 0 who follows an asset plan a.I ts a t i s ﬁes
V t


















where the expectations operator, Ei, is taken with respect to the random variables hk(s),{Tn}∞
n=1i
for s ≥ 0 and is indexed by i to indicate that the expectation is conditional on k(0) = i.C o l l e c t
terms to arrive at
V t





e−rsuk(s) (a0)ds + I{T1≤t}
∙Z T1
0































where the expectations operator, E, is taken with respect to {Tn}∞
n=1. It is shown in Lagos,
Rocheteau and Weill (2007, Lemma 2) that V t
i (a,0) converges to a ﬁnite limit V ∞
i (a,0) as
52t →∞ . After taking this limit we ﬁnd
V ∞
i (a,0) = Ei
½Z T1
0
















To arrive at (59), note that Tn =
Xn
k=1 (Tk − Tk−1) is the sum of n independent exponentially-
distributed random variables, so limt→∞ I{Tn−1≤t<Tn} =0and limt→∞ I{Tn≤t} =1almost surely
for all ﬁnite n ≥ 1. The former implies that the ﬁrst term on the right-side of (58) converges
to 0 as t →∞ . The latter implies that the second term of (58) converges to the ﬁrst term of
(59) and that the second and third terms of (58) converge to the second term of (59). To see









Any asset plan that is consistent with equilibrium must be bounded, hence the integrand of
(60) is bounded above. This integrand is also bounded below, since either u is bounded below
or else it satisﬁes the Inada condition which ensures that any optimal plan has a(s) > 0 for
all s. The fact that t − TNt < ∞ almost surely (because t − TNt is exponentially distributed)
implies that the integral in (60) is bounded. Finally, note that Pr(TNt <τ)=e−κ(t−τ) for any
τ<t ,s oTNt →∞almost surely as t →∞ , which means that (60) goes to 0 as t →∞ .
Now consider an optimal asset plan, a,a n ds c a l ei td o w nb y1−ε.D e ﬁne ∆ε ≡ V ∞
i (a,0)−
V ∞

































53Since the asset plan a is optimal, we can take the limit as ε → 0, apply L’Hôpital’s Rule and




















for each investor. We can use the market-clearing condition to write
Z
Ω
aω(t)dω = A, ∀t,















since (61) holds for each ω.T h e nTNt →∞almost surely as t →∞ ,s olimt→∞ e−rtp(t)=0 .
54